In this appendix, we verify that our results are robust to a number of changes. We first confirm that they are insensitive to the definition of industries (we obtain identical results using three-instead of two-digit SIC codes to identify industries), the length of the event window (our findings are unchanged when we use a three-day window from -1 to +1 day), and the definition of abnormal returns (again, we obtain identical results using raw returns and abnormal returns with respect to the CAPM model).
consistent with the finding that in the turnover regressions, the coefficient on an interacted regressor, Mkt Power x Size, is negative.
Finally, we also assess the informativeness of stock prices using a different approach. The paper uses the abnormal stock price reaction to earnings news as a proxy for the informativeness of stock prices. While this technique has a long tradition in finance and accounting i , one may not be entirely convinced that it captures the information content of prices. To reinforce the evidence, we employ a different approach, also frequently used in accounting (e.g. , Collins et al. (1994) , Durnev et al. (2003) ).
The idea to estimate how much information about future earnings is capitalized into stock prices by regressing current stock returns on future earnings. This method relies on two hypotheses. First, it assumes that revisions in expected dividends are correlated with revisions in expected earnings. Therefore, current stock returns can be expressed as a function of the current unexpected earnings and changes in expected future earnings. The second assumption is that current unexpected earnings can be proxied using the current change in earnings, and that changes in expected future earnings can be proxied using changes in realized future earnings. It follows that To assess the impact of firms' market power on their FERC and FINC, we group firms into market power groups and measure FERC and FINC within each group. To allow for time variation in coefficients, we rebalance groups every year. To mitigate the important influence of size, we first sort firms (every year) into size deciles, which we divide further into two market power groups. In this way, we obtain 20 groups of firms in every year. We denote by Control . We use the same controls as in the paper: return on assets, leverage, and the market-to-book ratio. Because we do not have Amihud's illiquidity measure over (Table III) .
Overall, we conclude that there is convincing evidence that product market power enhances trading, including that by insiders, and the informativeness of stock prices, in line with the model. This table presents results of annual Fama-MacBeth regressions of turnover on market power. Standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using the Newey-West procedure with one lag. The absolute value of t-statistics are displayed below the coefficient estimates. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for the two-tailed hypothesis test that the coefficient equals zero. See the tables in the paper for variable definitions. This table presents results of annual Fama-MacBeth regressions of insider trading on market power. In the left panel, insider trading activity is measured as the log of the ratio of a firm's annual total insider trading dollar volume to the firm's market capitalization, and it is denoted Insider turnover. In the right panel, it is measured as the log of the ratio of the firm's annual number of insider trades to its number of active insiders, denoted Number of insider trades. Standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using the Newey-West procedure with one lag. The absolute value of t-statistics are displayed below the coefficient estimates. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for the two-tailed hypothesis test that the coefficient equals zero. See the tables in the paper for variable definitions. This table presents results of annual Fama-MacBeth regressions of the absolute abnormal return surrounding an earnings announcement on market power. Standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation using the Newey-West procedure with one lag. The absolute value of t-statistics are displayed below the coefficient estimates. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for the twotailed hypothesis test that the coefficient equals zero. See the tables in the paper for variable definitions. the average value of the return on assets, leverage, market-to-book, and share turnover, in each year and within each size-market power group. Standard errors are clustered by year. The absolute value of t-statistics are displayed below the coefficient estimates. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for the two-tailed hypothesis test that the coefficient equals zero. See the tables in the paper for the variable definitions. 
